【編者按】

近日，清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心（CISS）研究員、中國論壇特約專家周波接受了印度媒體《印度教徒報》的專訪。他在專訪中指出，如果中印關(guān)系不僅僅等于邊境問題，雙方關(guān)系就還是健康的，而在很多積極因素作用下，中印兩國間的關(guān)系變得更加牢固。邊境問題可能很難解決，但周波認(rèn)為雙方可以先達(dá)成一些總的原則，并重申愿在邊境地區(qū)保持和平安寧而不發(fā)生任何沖突，這最符合兩國的利益。他還認(rèn)為，隨著中國、印度、東盟等國家和組織的崛起，“亞洲世紀(jì)”已經(jīng)到來。

去年底，中國現(xiàn)任外交部長秦剛曾在美國《國家利益》雜志發(fā)表署名文章，指出中印邊界當(dāng)前現(xiàn)狀，是雙方均愿采取措施緩和局勢，共同維護(hù)邊境和平安寧。而今年初CISS發(fā)布的《清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心2022年度報告：亞太命運共同體展望》中，對今后五年中國亞太外交提出的建議中也提到將中印邊界問題置于雙邊關(guān)系適當(dāng)位置，依托軍長級會談和邊境事務(wù)機制會議等渠道，在脫離接觸基礎(chǔ)上實現(xiàn)常態(tài)化管控，防止矛盾激化和失控。

作為中國與周邊國家重要且時有紛爭的雙邊關(guān)系，中印關(guān)系在今年會如何發(fā)展？兩國邊境問題的解決是否會出現(xiàn)曙光？澎湃新聞（www.nxos.com.cn）獲授權(quán)刊出這篇專訪，或許能為我們提供答案。

John Cherian：據(jù)您分析，為什么2017年后中印邊境實際控制線沿線的緊張局勢急劇升級？您是否認(rèn)為兩國強烈的民族主義情緒是該問題背后的原因之一？

周波：我認(rèn)為，中印邊境緊張局勢的根本原因顯然不在于中國的“民族主義”情緒。中國有充分理由確保中印邊境的和平，這也是中方一貫的態(tài)度。如果我們從大局來看，在中國被迫與美國競爭，特別是由于臺灣地區(qū)執(zhí)政的民進(jìn)黨的所作所為和美國的干涉造成臺灣問題對中國愈發(fā)棘手情況下，中方?jīng)]有理由在邊境實際控制線上對印度施壓。

我曾多次參與該問題的雙邊研討會。參與該問題的討論。我一直對印度學(xué)者說，如果你們認(rèn)為中國在邊境問題上預(yù)謀在先、刻意挑釁印度，那完全是誤解，我們沒有必要這樣做。因此，我不同意你關(guān)于民族主義影響中方?jīng)Q策的說法。在與我交談中，印度學(xué)者談到中國修建直通中印邊境的道路，他們似乎認(rèn)為中方此舉的目的是加強邊境地區(qū)的防務(wù)部署。這種理解是錯誤的。其實中印雙方都在修建直通邊境的公路。

中方修路還有一個原因，那就是中國一直在為扶貧做出巨大努力。我的經(jīng)驗是，要想富先修路。這是中國從四十多年改革歷程中得出的結(jié)論之一，也是中國推進(jìn)“一帶一路”倡議的原因之一，因為我們確實擅長基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)。那么，當(dāng)中國在全國各地修建道路設(shè)施，尤其涉及到邊境地區(qū)時，鄰國是否會將其視為一種軍事措施？你或許會說，高速公路或快速路能用于飛機起飛，但這不是修建公路的主要目的。如果你只從另一個角度來看這個問題，可能會產(chǎn)生誤解。我需要解釋這一點。

John Cherian：那么中國對印度在中印邊境實控線附近加快基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)有意見嗎？

周波：我認(rèn)為這就像軍備競賽中典型的兩難境地。無論一方做什么，都可能被另一方視為一種軍事準(zhǔn)備。如果兩者之間存有某種怨恨或敵意，就可能會導(dǎo)致另一方采取一些行動作為回應(yīng)。多年前，我曾從事與南亞相關(guān)的工作，當(dāng)時我經(jīng)常聽說，印度人在印方一側(cè)修路，導(dǎo)致我們處于劣勢。但是我憑直覺認(rèn)為，中國更擅長基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，所以我們的道路設(shè)施可能更好，或者現(xiàn)在修得更快。

John Cherian：自2017年的洞朗對峙事件以來，中印邊境的緊張局勢顯著加劇。洞朗事件是中印關(guān)系的一個轉(zhuǎn)折點，您是否認(rèn)同我的這一觀點？

周波：洞朗事件的發(fā)生令人非常遺憾。特別是中印兩國在1993年之后的幾十年里已經(jīng)維持了相當(dāng)長時間的和平，洞朗事件實在出乎中方意料。因為我們知道印度認(rèn)為洞朗地區(qū)是不丹的領(lǐng)土，而我們認(rèn)為洞朗地區(qū)屬于中國領(lǐng)土，但至少雙方都不認(rèn)為這是印度的領(lǐng)土。

John Cherian: 就是說洞朗的邊界是在不丹與中國之間，而不是在中印之間，對嗎？

周波：我說的就是，印度認(rèn)為洞朗是不丹領(lǐng)土，而我們認(rèn)為洞朗是中國領(lǐng)土，但中印兩國都不認(rèn)為洞朗是印度領(lǐng)土。那么，印度為什么要跳出來干涉？根據(jù)我對印度與不丹雙邊關(guān)系所做的一些研究，2007年的《印度-不丹友好條約》只要求兩國在涉及國家利益的問題上密切合作。事實上，這與你們過去的做法已經(jīng)有很大的不同。例如，1949年的雙邊條約曾明確規(guī)定，不丹的外交政策和外交事務(wù)必須接受印度的“指導(dǎo)”。  

通過比較就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，印度與不丹間的關(guān)系不是很正常的國家間關(guān)系。我想你們到2007年時終于發(fā)現(xiàn)，指導(dǎo)另一個國家的外交政策實在不合適。印度為何要“指導(dǎo)”另一個國家的外交政策？這說明你們實際上接替英國政府“指導(dǎo)”了不丹的外交政策。而后你們在2007年放棄了這一做法，改為在涉及國家利益的問題上密切合作。這樣固然沒問題，但你們派兵在中國與不丹之間插一杠子，這實在太過分了。我知道在印度，這被廣泛視為你們的勝利。但我不認(rèn)為這是一場勝利，因為此事表明，與印度無關(guān)的事情也可能成為中印之間的問題，這令中方感到無比震驚。當(dāng)然我不認(rèn)為這是加勒萬河谷沖突事件的直接原因。事實上，中印雙方（在加勒萬河谷沖突事件中）都有傷亡。

新的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會晤將有巨大幫助

John Cherian：在印度前總理拉吉夫·甘地與當(dāng)時的中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人鄧小平會晤后，中印邊境實際控制線沿線在很長一段時間保持了相對平靜。您認(rèn)為再舉行一次領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人峰會，會有幫助嗎？習(xí)主席曾在三年前到訪印度，但效果不大。需要馬上再有一次峰會嗎？

周波：我認(rèn)為新的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會晤將有巨大的幫助。正是因為在拉吉夫·甘地訪華期間，中印兩國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人提出了一些總體指導(dǎo)準(zhǔn)則，然后在1993年，我們雙方首次達(dá)成了《在中印邊境實際控制線地區(qū)保持和平與安寧的協(xié)定》。我注意到，在（去年的）G20巴厘島峰會上，莫迪總理與習(xí)近平主席握了握手。明年的G20峰會將在印度舉行。莫迪總理與習(xí)近平主席握手是友好的表示。鑒于邊境問題可能很難解決，我認(rèn)為雙方可以先達(dá)成一些總的原則，并重申愿在邊境地區(qū)保持和平安寧而不發(fā)生任何沖突，這最符合兩國的利益。

當(dāng)人們研判加勒萬河谷沖突事件時，得出的幾乎都是負(fù)面的教訓(xùn)，但我從中看到一些積極的東西。首先，中印在過去建立的信任措施發(fā)揮了作用，因為雙方都沒有試圖向?qū)Ψ介_槍。這是迄今為止雙方最重要的共識。這意味著無論士兵們?nèi)绾未蚨?，他們在潛意識里都知道不能向?qū)Ψ介_槍。不過據(jù)我所知，有印度士兵向空中鳴槍以示警告。

因此，我們可以說，這些建立信任措施的協(xié)議——至少其中的五個——發(fā)揮了作用。雖然這些措施沒有得到充分執(zhí)行，但已經(jīng)能讓雙方士兵不向?qū)Ψ介_槍，這一點非常重要。在21世紀(jì)的今天，兩個亞洲大國面臨如此困難的情況，也沒有試圖向?qū)Ψ介_槍，我相信，這對雙方來說都是一個很好的經(jīng)驗教訓(xùn)。如果我們牢記這一點，且雙方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人下達(dá)杜絕此類事件再次發(fā)生的明確指示，我相信兩國有望在邊境地區(qū)再維持至少40年的和平。這是可能的，盡管我認(rèn)為中印邊境問題不太可能在短期內(nèi)解決。

Quad不會發(fā)展成“小北約”

John Cherian：在您看來，印度加入四國安全對話機制（Quad）是導(dǎo)致中印關(guān)系下滑的原因之一嗎？

周波：首先，Quad的成立是由于中國，這是肯定的。真正的問題是，它是否針對中國。我相信美國、日本和澳大利亞一定程度都想把Quad發(fā)展成“反華俱樂部”，這三個國家已經(jīng)是盟友，所以印度的態(tài)度對該機制的生存和發(fā)展至關(guān)重要。我總體認(rèn)為，迄今為止，印度拒絕將Quad變成“反華俱樂部”。如果觀察Quad，就會發(fā)現(xiàn)目前其唯一的軍事成分僅是一個名為“馬拉巴爾”的軍事演習(xí)，僅此而已。

目前Quad正朝許多方向發(fā)展，包括疫苗分配、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)和應(yīng)對氣候變化。我對Quad在應(yīng)對氣候變化上能發(fā)揮多大作用表示懷疑，因為氣候變化是一個全世界面臨的共同問題，不可能僅靠四個國家來解決。我也不認(rèn)為Quad會發(fā)展成類似北約或“小北約”的機制。事實上，我對印度外交政策的獨立性有一定信心，相信你們的外交政策還不至于被其他國家牽著鼻子走。

John Cherian：您相信印度將保持其外交政策的戰(zhàn)略自主性？

周波：是的，沒錯。

“亞洲世紀(jì)”已經(jīng)到來

John Cherian：無論如何，中國仍然是印度最大的貿(mào)易伙伴，印度仍然積極參與金磚國家（BRICS）、俄印中三國機制（RIC）和上海合作組織（SCO），所以我認(rèn)為雙方還有很多合作空間。

周波：當(dāng)然，我完全同意。一些印度人想太多了，以為印度拒絕加入“一帶一路”會對中國造成打擊。我不這么認(rèn)為，因為“一帶一路”的合作國家太多了，且印度已經(jīng)是亞投行的成員，而亞投行實際上與“一帶一路”存在很多聯(lián)系。據(jù)我所知，印度拒絕加入“一帶一路”是因為“一帶一路”經(jīng)過查謨-克什米爾。我認(rèn)為，“一帶一路”是一條沿線國家根據(jù)自身國情自愿參與的虛線，而非一條無縫銜接的實線。“一帶一路”是中國的倡議，如果其他國家加入，我們當(dāng)然歡迎。如果有些國家出于某些原因有所保留，我們也理解。盡管存在這一問題，中印兩國在上海合作組織和金磚國家的機制中保持著良好的合作。

我想跟您談一個更重要的事情。我堅信，“亞洲世紀(jì)”已經(jīng)到來。國際社會普遍認(rèn)為，全球地緣政治重心正在向東亞轉(zhuǎn)移。在我看來，雖然歐洲心臟地帶的戰(zhàn)火不知道會持續(xù)多久，但這場烏克蘭危機只會加速全球地緣政治重心轉(zhuǎn)移的進(jìn)程，人們的注意力將被吸引到東亞地區(qū)。我想進(jìn)一步指出的是，“亞洲世紀(jì)”的來臨不僅僅是因為中國在東亞的崛起，還因為印度、印度尼西亞等國家和東盟等組織的崛起。隨著亞洲的集體崛起，“亞洲世紀(jì)”已經(jīng)到來。十年后，中國可能成為全球第一大經(jīng)濟體。我說“可能”，是考慮到中國經(jīng)濟增長已經(jīng)放緩，中國人口正在老齡化，有些人現(xiàn)在對這一目標(biāo)表示懷疑。但這也難說，因為根據(jù)國際貨幣基金組織的數(shù)據(jù)，中國今年的經(jīng)濟增速或?qū)⒊^5%。我不知道中國能否在未來十年內(nèi)保持5%的經(jīng)濟增速，但如果我們能做到，那么中國將成為世界上最大的經(jīng)濟體，而印度十年后可能成為世界第三大經(jīng)濟體。因此，我們兩國如何處理彼此關(guān)系至關(guān)重要，因為這將成為一種完全不同的關(guān)系。

中印關(guān)系不僅僅等于邊境問題

John Cherian：中國已經(jīng)與除印度以外的所有國家解決了陸地邊界問題，為什么唯獨沒解決與印度的邊境問題？是不是因為中印邊境問題太復(fù)雜了，涉及到英國殖民時代的遺留問題？以及地圖的繪制方式？

周波：邊境問題確實太復(fù)雜。中國沒有理由不希望與印度解決邊境問題，但是在一些最基本的認(rèn)知上，中印兩國都無法達(dá)成一致。例如，中國認(rèn)為中印邊界線長度是2000公里，而印度認(rèn)為巴基斯坦將印度在克什米爾的領(lǐng)土割讓給中國，所以（中印邊界長度）是3488公里。如果我們連對邊界線的長度認(rèn)知都不一致，那怎么可能解決這個問題？在過去，中國的想法是東西段互相交換一部分，但印度不同意。中國希望采取由上至下的解決方法，雙方先確定互讓的原則，再開始做一些具體的工作。但印度認(rèn)為，問題的根本原因是雙方不知道實際控制線的走向，所以要求先勘察驗證。印度提出的方法是自下而上的。

在上世紀(jì)90年代，我曾是中國邊境談判的軍事專家，所以我知道解決該問題有多難。舉個例子，為了解對方眼中有爭議地區(qū)的具體位置，我們曾互換地圖，但雙方無法就哪些是爭議地區(qū)達(dá)成一致。然而，我想說的是，至少我們達(dá)成了五個關(guān)于維持實際控制線附近和平與安寧的信任協(xié)議，這五個協(xié)議非常重要。在1993至2003年間，中國與印度的雙邊信任措施比中國與任何其他國家間的都多，相比之下，中國與美國只有2-3個信任協(xié)議。中印雙邊信任協(xié)議的內(nèi)容非常具體，其中包括：在實際控制線附近，不應(yīng)該舉行師級以上演習(xí)；如果要開展旅級演習(xí)，應(yīng)該事先通知對方；軍用飛機不應(yīng)該在距離實際控制線10公里內(nèi)飛行；當(dāng)一方的部隊在巡邏時，另一方不應(yīng)尾隨。這些措施都非常詳細(xì)。由于加勒萬河谷沖突事件，一些人認(rèn)為雙方建立的信任措施失效了。我不同意這種說法，我認(rèn)為這些措施仍然很有效。如果雙方連巡邏部隊相遇時的行為規(guī)則等細(xì)節(jié)都討論過，哪里還需要新措施？當(dāng)然，如果有人能指出我的觀點有誤，我會欣然接受。

我們需要政治承諾來避免此類事件的再次發(fā)生。我認(rèn)為，我們應(yīng)該仔細(xì)梳理這些信任措施，并認(rèn)真地執(zhí)行所有這些措施。有些事情確實困難，例如1993年協(xié)議提到的核查實際控制線。但還有很多其他事情可以做。例如，我在所撰寫的文章中也建議，兩國軍隊?wèi)?yīng)在最危險的對峙區(qū)域脫離接觸。這一點已經(jīng)實現(xiàn)，雙方已經(jīng)在班公湖地區(qū)、溫泉地區(qū)等處脫離接觸，我認(rèn)為這就是正確的問題處理方式。

John Cherian：中國新任外交部部長秦剛上任后不久曾表示，他的首要任務(wù)之一是改善與印度的關(guān)系，緩解中印邊境實際控制線附近的緊張局勢。我認(rèn)為這是個明智的舉動。但我認(rèn)為，印度方面也需要有對等的表態(tài)。

周波：您的看法沒錯。我認(rèn)為目前印度政府的態(tài)度正變得有點像拉吉夫·甘地訪華之前的態(tài)度，即印度方面愿意處理邊境問題，但在邊境問題得到妥善處理前，印度認(rèn)為兩國關(guān)系的其他領(lǐng)域無法得到實質(zhì)性改善。我認(rèn)為這是錯誤的，市場力量也可以證明印方的這種態(tài)度是錯誤的。2021年，盡管印度政府對中資企業(yè)實施了打壓，但中印雙邊貿(mào)易額仍創(chuàng)下歷史新高。這就說明，在很多積極因素的作用下，中印兩國間的關(guān)系變得更加牢固。如果中印關(guān)系不僅僅等于邊境問題，雙方關(guān)系就還是健康的。我由衷希望印度政府能夠從更多元的角度來看待中印關(guān)系。正如我之前所言，我們不希望邊境問題再次成為中印間的沖突爆發(fā)點。

（翻譯：吳子浩；校對：韓樺 申青青。本文文內(nèi)小標(biāo)題為編者所擬。）

專訪英文版：

John Cherian: Why do you believe there has been an alarming rise in tensions along the LAC after 2017? Do you believe that muscular nationalism in both countries plays a role?  

Zhou Bo: The fundamental reason for the tension, I believe is not because of nationalism on the Chinese side. The reason is simple. China has all good reasons to make sure that the border between China and India is peaceful. This kind of thing didn’t happen just now; it happened quite often in the past. And if we look at the bigger picture, there is no reason whatsoever from the Chinese side to add pressure on India on the Line of Actual Control, when China is forced into competition with the United States, and the Taiwan issue is becoming more difficult for China to handle, particularly because of the ruling DPP party in Taiwan and the interference from the United States.

I have been in quite a few bilateral seminars on this issue. I always told Indian scholars, if you believe China is purposefully ambushing India on the border issue, that is totally wrong. There’s no need for us to do that. So I don’t agree with what you have described; that nationalism would play a role in Chinese decision-making. And on the part of India, in my conversations with Indian scholars, they talked about China building roads leading to the border areas, as if China is doing it purposefully to increase its defence along the border. This is wrong. The fact is both sides are building roads leading to the border.

And there is another reason, that is, China has been making great efforts to alleviate poverty. We find through experience that good roads lead to a better life. This is one of the conclusions we have drawn from our reform in over 40 years. This is also one of the reasons why China is promoting the Belt & Road initiative because China is really good at infrastructure building. So, when we are building these road connections across China, especially when it comes to the border, would it be taken by the other side as a kind of military measure? Well, you can say that a highway or expressway could be used for an aircraft taking off, but it’s not the primary purpose for building a road. I think if you look from the other side, there could be a kind of misunderstanding. I just want to explain that.

John Cherian: But does China have any problems with India’s accelerated infrastructure building along the LAC?

Zhou Bo: I think this like the typical dilemma in the arms race. You know, whatever one side is doing might be viewed by the other side as a kind of a build-up. If there is a kind of acrimony or hostility between the two sides, this could just cause the other side to do something in response. When I was working on South Asian affairs a long time ago, I always heard things like how Indians are building roads on their side, therefore we are in the inferior position…  but my conclusion is because China is better in infrastructure building, so our roads are probably better or we are building roads faster now. That is my gut feeling.

John Cherian: Tensions have noticeably risen since 2017, since the Doklam incident. If my view is correct, the Doklam incident was a kind of turning point in relations between the two countries?

Zhou Bo: It is most unfortunate to see what has happened in Doklam, especially because, first of all, we have maintained peace for quite some time, in fact for decades after 1993. And the Doklam incident is really a big surprise to China in that we know India believes that this is Bhutanese territory while we in China believe this is Chinese Territory. But at least neither side believes this is Indian territory.

John Cherian: The border was between Bhutan and China, not between India and China in Doklam, am I correct?

Zhou Bo: I mean even if India believes Doklam is Bhutanese territory, and we believe this is Chinese territory, none of us would believe this is Indian territory, right? So, why would India jump in to have this kind of interference? I did some research on your bilateral relationship with Bhutan, the India-Bhutan friendship treaty in 2007 only obliges you to cooperate closely with each other on issues related to the national interest. This actually came a long way from what you had in the past, for example, the treaty in 1949 that made clear that Bhutanese foreign policy and foreign affairs have to be guided by India.

So, if I compare this, I would find that your relationship with Bhutan is not a very normal, country-to-country relationship. I assume in 2007 you found finally that it was really not appropriate for you to guide another country’s foreign policy. Why would you guide a country’s foreign policy? Because that means you have actually succeeded the British government in “guiding” Bhutanese foreign policy. And then in 2007, you relinquished that and changed it to say you would cooperate closely on issues relating to the national interest. But even if this is alright, for you to send armed forces to stand between China and Bhutan, that really went too far. I know in India it was widely taken as a victory on your side. I don’t believe it is a victory because it shows really in a very alarming way how something that has nothing to do with India could become an issue between China and India. This is alarming for us, but I won’t say that this is the direct reason for the deadly brawl in the Galwan Valley. The fact is we also had casualties, as you did.

John Cherian: After former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping met, there was a long period of comparative calm along the LAC. Do you think another summit will help? I know President Xi was in India three years ago, and it didn’t really help. Do you think another meeting would be timely?

Zhou Bo: I would think it would help tremendously because it is during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China that the leaders of the two countries actually put forward some general guidelines. Then in 1993, we have the first agreement of maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control. I saw Prime Minister Modi shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at G-20 in Bali for a very short time. Next year we’re going to have the G-20 in India. I believe Prime Minister Modi’s reaching out to President Xi is an olive branch. Because the border issue can be very difficult to resolve, I think some general guidelines and a reconfirmation for us to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border without any conflict at all best serve the interests of the two countries.

When people read about this conflict in the Galwan Valley, almost all the lessons they drew are negative, but I would still see something positive in this. The first point is that the confidence-building measures in the past have worked. Why? Because neither side has attempted to shoot at the other side. This is the most important agreement between the two sides so far. That means subconsciously, no matter how the soldiers fought, they knew they should not shoot at each other, although to my knowledge, Indian soldiers did shoot into the sky as a kind of warning.

So, we cannot argue that these confidence-building measures agreements-- at least five of them, didn’t work at all. True, they are not fully implemented, but they have worked to the extent that the soldiers did not try to shoot at each other. This is so important that in the 21st century, two giants in Asia in Asia didn’t attempt to shoot each other in this kind of difficult situation. I believe this is a good lesson for both of us. If we bear this in mind, and if our leaders give us clear instructions that this kind of thing should never happen again, I believe we probably could have at least another 40 years of peace along the border. This is possible, although I’m not so confident about resolving the border issue any time soon.

John Cherian: Do you think India’s membership of the QUAD has been a factor in the downslide in relations?

Zhou Bo: First of all, the formation of QUAD is because of China… definitely. The real question is, is QUAD against China? I believe the United States, along with Japan and Australia, would want to make it a kind of club that is against China. India, of course, is a lynchpin in that the other three are already allies. Therefore, India’s attitude is critical. But I’m somewhat convinced that India so far has refused to make it the “Anti-China Club”. If you look at the QUAD, currently the only military element is a military exercise called the Malabar. There is nothing more than that.

It is evolving in many other directions like the distribution of vaccines, infrastructure, climate change. Actually, I have some doubts about how effective it would be if it is addressing an issue like climate change, because climate change is a universal problem. It cannot be resolved by four countries alone. I don’t think Quad will become a kind of NATO or mini-NATO organisation, either. Actually, I have some confidence in your foreign policy being independent or not being siphoned away so easily.

John Cherian: You mean you believe India will retain its strategic autonomy in foreign policy?

Zhou Bo: Yes, I think so.

John Cherian: But, despite everything, China continues to be India’s biggest trading partner. And India is still active in the BRICS, the RIC, Shanghai Cooperation and SCO. So I think there is still a lot of scope for cooperation...

Zhou Bo: Of course, I totally agree. Some Indians think too much about how India’s rejection of joining BRI would be a blow to China. I don’t think so, because BRI is so big, and you are already a member of the AIIB. The AIIB is actually having a lot of things to do with the BRI. I know you reject it because it passes through Jammu & Kashmir. But I consider BRI to be a dotted line along which countries volunteer to join in line with their actual conditions, not a whole line that is seamless. This is a Chinese proposal, if some other countries join it, of course we’re happy. But if some other countries have some reservations for certain reasons, we understand. In spite of this issue, we’re having good cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in BRICS.

I want to tell you something bigger than this. I truly believe the Asian century has already arrived. Very few people disagree that international geopolitics is shifting towards East Asia. And the war in Ukraine, in my opinion, would just accelerate this process. Of course, the war in the heart of Europe is raging on without a deadline. So things would move faster towards East Asia and people’s attention would be drawn to this part of the world. But the point I want to make is that it’s not only China standing tall in East Asia, it’s also because of the rise of other countries and organisations—such as India, Indonesia and organisations like ASEAN. So this rise is a collective rise of Asia. The Asian century has already arrived. In 10 years, China might become the largest economy in the world. I say “might” because there are some doubts about it now given that the Chinese economy has slowed down and the Chinese population is aging. But it’s hard to say because according to IMF, the Chinese economy this year could be more than 5%. Could we maintain this 5% in ten years to come? I don’t know, but if we can, then we will become the largest economy in the world and you would become the third largest economy in the world in ten years. So how we deal with each other becomes critical since the relationship is totally different.

John Cherian: China has solved its land border issues with all countries except India. Why? What is the real reason? Is it because it’s too complicated, the legacy of British imperialism, the way the map was drawn?

Zhou Bo: I think the border issue is too complicated. There’s no reason why China doesn’t want to resolve the border issue with India. You see, the border is complicated to the extent that even the simplest things cannot be agreed upon. For example, we believe the border is 2000 kilometres and you believe it’s 3488 km because Pakistan ceded Indian territory in Kashimir to China. If we cannot even agree on the length of the border, how can we possibly resolve it? And yes, historically, the Chinese idea is to have a kind of swap of land… the western sector with the eastern sector, but India disagrees. The Chinese approach is a top-down approach; let’s have the swap, and then we start to do something in detail. And you would say, well, the fundamental reason for this problem is because we do not know where the Line of Actual Control runs. So let’s verify it first. Your approach is bottom-up.

I have been a Chinese military expert in border negotiation back in 1990s, so I know how difficult this issue is. For example, we changed our maps to see where are the dispute areas in the eyes of the other side, but we could not agree that these are the disputed areas. But what I want to say is, at least, we have five agreements on confidence building regarding maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control. These five agreements are very important. I found China actually has more confidence-building measures with India than with any other countries — from 1993 to 2003. With the United States, in comparison, we only have 2-3 agreements. Between China and India, our agreements even mentioned how we should not conduct exercises above the division level along the line of actual control; how we should notify each other if we have a brigade level exercise; how we should not fly military aircraft within ten kilometres of the Line of Actual Control; how we should not follow the other side in patrol. These are very detailed. Because of the clash in Galwan Valley, some people argue that the confidence-building measures have failed. I disagree. I would say they are still very useful.  If you have even talked about such details of how patrolling troops should behave during encounters, what new measures are needed? But I shall be happy if people can point out that I am really wrong.

We need a political commitment to not let this happen again. I believe we should comb through these measures to see how we can really, seriously implement all of them. Some things are difficult, for example, like the 1993 agreement to verify the Line of Actual Control, that is difficult. But there are so many things that can actually be done. For example, I have suggested even in my writing that the two militaries should deconflict from the most dangerous standoff points. And this happened exactly as I said. For example, we have deconflicted from the Pangong Tso lake, from Hot Spring etc. This is how I believe things could be managed.

John Cherian: The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang said in one of his first statements that one of his priorities is to improve relations with India and ease tensions along the LAC. I think that’s a good move. But, I think, a reciprocal move is still being awaited from the Indian side.

Zhou Bo: I think your observation is correct. I actually believe the Indian government’s attitude is becoming slightly like India’s attitude before Rajiv Gandhi visited China. That is, let’s deal with the border issue and until it is dealt with properly, the other fields of the relationship cannot improve substantively…. I think this is wrong, and market forces can prove it is wrong, too. In 2021, in spite of Indian government’s bashing of Chinese companies, bilateral trade still reached a historical record. That means the ties between the two countries are stronger now supported by more positive elements. If China-Indian relationship is not only about the border issue, this is a healthy thing. I really hope the Indian government can think about this from a more diversified perspective. As I mentioned before, we do not want this border issue to become a flashpoint between us again.